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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2-(3)(j) and Rule 
4A of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court follow the mandate of John 
Call Engineering, Inc., vs. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 
1205 (Utah 1987)? 
2. Did the trial court err in allowing Manti, on 
the day of trial and over the objection of Call, to amend 
its answer and allege mitigation of damages? 
3. Did the trial court err by not granting Call 
a continuance? 
4. Did the trial court commit reversible error when 
it failed to submit Call's jury instructions? 
5. Did the trial court commit reversible error by 
allowing any irrelevant or prejudicial issues in the trial 
proceeding? 
6. Did the trial court err in denying Call's motion 
for a directed verdict and in denying Call's motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, 
motion to amend the judgment, or in the alternative, motion 
for a new trial? 
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7. Did the trial court err in not taxing as costs 
against Manti the expert witness fees incurred by Call? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules and regulations are attached in Respondent's 
addendum in the addendum to Respondent's brief. They 
are: Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 8; Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 15; Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 40; Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 21-5-4 1953 (as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Sixth 
Judicial District Court in and for Sanpete County awarding 
the appellant John Call Engineering, Inc., ("Call") $13,440 
plus pre-judgment interest based on stipulation to run 
from January 1, 1984 and costs against the respondent 
Manti City Corp. ("Manti") and a subsequent order denying 
Call's motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict, or 
in the alternative, motion to amend the judgment, or in 
the alternative, motion for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT 
TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. John Call Engineering sued Manti City for breach 
of an engineering services contract. 
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2. After a non-jury trial, Judge Tibbs entered a 
judgment in favor of Manti. Call appealed. (R. 182, 
183, 185 & 186. ) 
3. The Utah Supreme Court reversed Judge Tibbs1 
decision instructed him to determine Call's damages giving 
careful consideration to mitigation and enter judgment 
in favor of Call. John Call Engineering Inc., v. Manti 
City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1210 (Utah 1987). 
4. A second trial, this time before a jury, was 
held. (R. 247-261. ) 
5. Call made a Motion in Limine to limit or exclude 
evidence and argument to the following issues: 
(a) Whether Call should be paid for work 
not performed. 
(b) Whether the judgment would be paid 
out of juror and/or taxpayer's pockets. 
(c) Whether Call mitigated his damages. 
(R. 235-246.) 
6. The court denied the Motion in Limine but indicated 
to counsel he could object during the trial. Manti amended 
its answer by alleging mitigation of damages. (Transcript 
of Proceedings, January 12 & 13, 1989 p. 67-73, hereinafter 
Tr.) The amendment did not prejudice Call. 
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7. The court initially offered Call a continuance 
of the trial. (Tr. 73.) 
8. On reconsideration and upon case review the court 
determined the case would proceed. (Tr. 75.) 
9. Thereafter, the court allowed the issue of mitigation 
of damages, (Tr. 182) pursuant to Supreme Court instruction. 
10. The original contract was introduced into evidence 
by Appellant. (Tr. 211-212.) 
11. The court instructed the jury on the meausre 
of damages which included mitigation. 
12. The court repeatedly admonished the jury they 
were only to consider the measure of damages to Appellant. 
(Tr. 81, 82.) 
13. Appellants direct testimony ranged from $57,900.00 
to $191,998.00 without consideration to any mitigation. 
This inconsistancy was based on testimony offered by different 
witnesses. 
14. On cross examination numerous inconsistancies 
were revealed such as inspection fees, (Tr. 209) payment 
of taxes, (Tr. 229), amounts paid and costs. (Tr. 232) 
15. Evidence was introduced showing net profits 
ranged from 3 to 36% but averaged around 6%. 
16. Respondent called David Thurgood as an expert 
witness. 
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17. At the close of plaintiff's case, the plaintiff 
moved the court for a directed verdict in the sum of not 
less than $56,377. The court denied plaintiff's motion. 
18. The court properly instructed the jury on law 
to determine damages. 
19. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Call 
for $13,440. (R. 262.) 
20. Call filed timely motions under Rule 50 and 
59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure amended judgment 
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the 
alternative, motion for a new trial. (R. 276-294.) 
21. The trial court denied Call's motion and denied 
Call's request for expert witness fee costs. (R. 335-336.) 
22. Call appealed. (R. 339-340.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT FOLLOWED THE MANDATE 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court in John Call Engineering Inc. 
vs. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1987) instructed 
the lower court to determine Call's damages and enter 
judgment in favor of Call. 
The trial court instructed the jury on determination 
of damages and repeatedly admonished the jury to only 
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consider damages. 
The contract was introduced into evidence by Call 
and consideration of the contract was essential in making 
a determination of damages. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
ALLOWED THE DEFENDANT TO AMEND ITS ANSWER AND ALLEGE 
MITIGATION OF DAMAGES. 
The court allowed Manti City to amend its answer 
to allege the unpled mitigation of damages defense. Likewise, 
the court allowed Call to amend pleadings to increase 
the amount of damages. 
The amendment allowing consideration of mitigation 
merely followed remand instructions. 
Such an amendment in no way prejudiced Call. Manti 
City's trial conduct and strategy of only calling David 
Thurgood as a witness and relying on cross examination 
of Call witnesses made no difference in Calls preparation 
for the mitigation defense. Call was on notice based 
on the remand instructions. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING 
TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL. 
Call was not prejudiced because there was really 
nothing for Call to prepare for. 
Because Call was not prejudiced by the courts denying 
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the continuance there was no abuse of the courts discretion. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR 
BY FAILING TO GIVE CALL'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS. 
The court adequately gave the jury instructions that 
because Manti breached the contract, Call was entitled 
to the amount of damages that would place him in the same 
financial position as if he had completed the contract 
and had been paid in full. 
The court further instructed the jury that lost profits 
could be awarded if they could be established from the 
evidence. 
The jury was properly instructed. 
POINT V 
THE COURT DID NOT ALLOW MANTI TO PRESENT IRRELEVANT AND 
PREJUDICIAL ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS TO THE JURY. 
References by Manti City to the original contract 
were not irrelevant or prejudicial. The contract was 
introduced by Call. An examination of the contract was 
essential to determine damages. Amounts paid to Call 
were essential. The contract reference to inspection 
was essential to determine damages. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DIRECTED A VERDICT 
IN FAVOR OF CALL FOR AT LEAST $56,000 OR 
AWARDED A NEW TRIAL. 
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Calls evidence in attempting to establish damages 
was contradictory. Each witness called testified to a 
different amount. Cross-examination further exposed the 
lack of credibility of Calls witnesses. Calls witnesses 
failed to properly consider mitigation. 
Call himself testified he did not know what the damages 
were becaue he had not had time to calculate it. The 
$56,000 demand as a directed verdict does not give consideration 
to the jurys view of the percent of profit evidence. 
POINT VII 
CALL SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED 
HIS EXPERT WITNESS FEE COSTS. 
Utah statutes set forth the amount of witness fees. 
Utah case law does not extend the award of witness fees 
to include high expert witness fees. Manti should not 
be required to pay deposition costs and expert witness 
fees of Ccills own witnesses. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT FOLLOWED THE MANDATE 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Appellant contends that the trial court failed to 
follow the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court in Call's 
post-appellate trial on damages. In reality, however, 
the court insured that the trial focused solely on the 
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issue of damages, and it expressly follow the directions 
of the supreme court by considering mitigation evidence. 
As noted below, the issue of mitigation in a contract 
cause goes exclusively to the issue of damages. Consequently, 
the court not only follow the supreme court's express 
mandate, it acted consistent with the rule that when damages 
are at issue, mitigation is always a factor to be considered. 
The jury was charged and instructed their only duty was 
to determine damages. Throughout the trial they were 
admonished only to consider and determine damages. (Tr. 
81, 82) 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN 
IT ALLOWED THE DEFENDANT TO AMEND ITS ANSWER AND ALLEGE 
MITIGATION OF DAMAGES 
Appellant contends that the trial court committed 
reversible error when it allowed Respondent to amend its 
answer at trial to allege mitigation of damages as a defense 
to Appellant's damages claim at trial. Appellant claims 
that Respondent's motion to amend was tardy and therefor 
should not have been granted. Under Rule 15 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, however, the trial court has 
broad discretion to grant parties leave to amend their 
pleadings, and "leave shall be freely given when justice 
so requires." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a). 
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Moreover, there is nothing wrong with moving to amend 
pleadings at trial to conform to the evidence. Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure Rule 15(b). Appellant iself, took 
advantage of this rule to move to amend its complaint, 
even later in the trial, to increase the amount of damages 
prayed for. (Tr. 312) Mutuality and justice demand equal 
treatment of both sides. Consequently, Appellant should 
not be able to attack Respondent's motion to amend while 
advocating its own. It was well within the trial court's 
discretion to grant Respondent's motion to amend its answer 
to include the issue of mitigation, particularly when 
tbe trial focused solely on the question of damages and 
the Utah Supreme Court had directed the trial court to 
consider mitigation. John Call Engineering Inc. vs. Manti 
City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1210, (Utah, 1987) (Orme, 
J*, concurring) (specifically directing the trial court 
ta carefully scrutinize Appellant's damages, including 
evidence of mitigation. ) 
Call claims that mitigation of damages is a defense 
wlich must be affirmatively pled under Rule 8 of the Utah 
Riles of Civil Procedure. Appellant cites several cases 
tt support its conclusive proposition that failure to 
aSf irmatively plead mitigation in the first instance waives 
a defendant's right to assert the defense foreverafter. 
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Appellant places the greatest emphasis on Gill vs. Timm, 720 
P.2d 1352 (Utah, 1986). Counsel claims that in Gill, 
the Utah Supreme Court specifically held that the failure 
to plead mitigation of damages as an affirmative defense, 
waives any mitigation of damages issue at trial. (Appellant's 
brief p. 14). Not only does counsel misconstrue the holding 
in Gill, he completely ignored the case of Price-Orem 
Inv., Co., vs. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, 713 P.2d 55 (Utah, 
1986), in which the court specifically held that failure 
to plea mitigation does not result in an automatic waiver 
of the defense. See Price-Orem 713 P.2d at 59. Moreover, 
Gill can be distinguished from the instant case because 
it involved a pure tort claim instead of a contract dispute 
or even a contract-like dispute. More importantly, in 
both Gill and Pratt vs. Board of Education, 564 P.2d 294, 
(Utah, 1977), (another case relied upon by Appellant), 
not only did the defendants fail to plead mitigation as 
a defense, they also failed to introduce any evidence 
on that issue at trial. The Gill court specifically noted 
that despite the defendant's failure to plead mitigation, 
if he had presented evidence 0£ argument on that issue 
at trial "he might have been entitled to a post-trial 
amendment to his answer under Rule 15(b) to include mitigation 
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of damages as an affirmative defense," in accordance with 
the court's earlier ruling in Price-Orem. Gill vs. Timmf 
720 P.2d at 1354 (citing Price-Orem, 713 P.2d at 58-59; 
other citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
In this case Respondent moved to amend its Answer 
to include the affirmative defense of mitigation prior 
to the trial on damages. Respondent concedes that it 
did not assert the issue of mitigation at the first trial 
-- concerning the contract's validity -- because damages 
were not at issue. Mitigation is not a defense to contract 
validity. Evidence of mitigation goes strictly to the 
issue of damages; it is not used to dispute or undermine 
the validity of a contract. Hence, because the trial 
court found the contract invalid, it would have been illogical 
for Respondent to address mitigation at the first trial. 
Because damages were not at issue, and Respondent had 
not need to counter Call's damage claim with a mitigation 
argument. 
Appellant claims that it was prejudiced when the 
trial court granted Appellant's motion to amend, because 
Call was surprised and had insufficient notice and opportunity 
to prepare for that defense. Plaintiffs in Price-Orem 
made a similar argument. The court found, however, that 
the claims of surprise and lack of notice were without 
merit because both the pleadings and opening statements 
showed that plaintiff was "clearly aware that the issue 
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of damages was the central one." Price-Orem 713 P.2d 
at 59, supra. The court held that under such circumstances 
defendant was not precluded from introducing evidence 
on mitigation. In this case Appellant obviously knew 
(or had reason to know) that the Respondent might assert 
mitigation as a defense to Call's damages claim. That 
fact is clearly evidence by Call's own Motion to Limine 
to exclude argument and evidence on mitigation. Moreover, 
the supreme court's opinion and directions clearly put 
Call on notice that mitigation would be considered on 
remand. See John Call Engineering vs. Manti City Corp./ 
743 P.2d at 1210 (Orme, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
Such obvious constructive notice should preclude Appellant 
from claiming surprise or prejudice. 
Appellant makes a great deal of the fact that the 
trial court first granted a continuance, then changed 
its mind. (Appellant brief pp. 15-16, 18-21.) Appellant 
fails to explain why the court changed its mind. In an 
attempt to persuade the court not to grant the motion 
to amend during preliminary proceedings in chambers. Appellant's 
counsel handed the court a copy of the case Gill vs. Timm, 
720 P.2d 1352, and asserted that it was dispositive of 
the issue at hand. (Tr. 67) After looking at the case, 
however, the court noticed that Gill is distinguishable 
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(as noted above), and therefore not controlling. More 
importantly, the court had taken the opportunity to refresh 
its understanding of the Utah Supreme Court's opinion 
and directions for remand in this case on its first appeal. 
John Call Engineering vs. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205 
(Utah, 1987), (Tr. 72-76). After taking a closer look 
at the court's directions, the court reasonably concluded 
that the supreme court specifically directed him to look 
at all issues bearing on damages, including mitigations. 
(Tr. 76) 
Although Appellant claims that the amendment prejudiced 
its position, Call could not have been prejudiced because 
instead of producing numerous witnesses or evidence of 
its own regarding mitigation, Respondent's trial strategy 
relied on cross examination of Appellant's own witnesses. 
It is difficult to conceive of anything else Appellant 
could have done to prepare for Respondent's case on mitigation. 
John Call testified about other jobs his company had after 
the contract was repudiated. (Tr. 242-258) Charles Peterson 
testified as to Call's potential capacity to generate 
revenue. (Tr. 268-82) The testimony of both witnesses 
should have been the same regardless of whether or 
not mitigation was at issue. Appellant's apparent 
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lack of preparation was manifest only with regard to the 
amount of actual damages incurred (Tr. 231-237); see also 
Appellant's brief at 6 (claiming either $191,998 or $136f334, 
or $70,278 or $57f990). Consequently, Call's claim of 
prejudice and lack of notice is groundless. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING 
TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL 
Call claims that the trial court erred in failing 
to continue the trial. Appellant is correct in noting 
that the general proposition that a continuance should 
be granted if substantial prejudice will result from going 
forward. As noted above, however, Appellant's assertion 
that Call was prejudice is hollow. Appellant anticipated 
the defense of mitigation, and had adequate opportunity 
to prepare for it. Moreover, based on Respondent's trial 
strategy more intense preparation would have been of little 
consequence. 
Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure grants 
trial courts substantial discretion in deciding whether 
or not to grant a continuance. See Christensen vs. Jewkes, 
761 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah, 1988). Consequently, the standard 
of review is very high and the trial court's decision 
should be reversed only for clear abuse of discretion. 
See Id. at 1377. Call emphasizes the fact that the court 
seriously considered granting a continuance, then changed 
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its mind. As noted above, however, the court had good 
cause to change its mind after reading Gill vs. Timm, 
720 P.2d 1352, re-examining the supreme court's instructions 
for remand in John Call Engineering vs. Manti City Corp., 
743 P.2d 1205, and balancing the consideration involved 
in granting Respondent's motion to amend. See Tr., at 
67, 72-76. The court clearly weighed the important factors, 
including adequacy of notice and potential for prejudice, 
as well as judicial economy, delay, and other concerns 
relevant to the decision of whether or not to grant a 
continuance, and acted with a reasonableness that was 
well within its discretion. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR 
BY FAILING TO GIVE CALL'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in failing 
to give several of its requested jury instructions regarding 
calculation of damages. (Appellant's brief pp. 21-25.) 
The issue on review, however, should not be whether the 
trial court failed to give all of Appellant's instructions, 
concededly, all were not given. The issue is whether 
or not the instructions the court gave were adequate. 
In evaluating challenged jury instructions, the instructions 
must be considered as a whole. See Startin vs. Madsen, 
237 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah, 1951). Even when a trial court 
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refuses substantively correct jury instructions, if the 
court covers the substance of the law in its own instructions 
viewed as a whole, they are adequate. See Hardman vs. 
Thurman 239 P.2d 215, 219 (Utah, 1951). Moreover, "[t]he 
instructions should not be susceptible of misconstruction 
as either comments on the evidence or arguments for either 
side of the case." Startin, 237 P.2d at 836. In this 
case, Appellant clearly attempted to provide commentary 
through several of its proposed jury instructions. The 
trial court reasonably denied them on the basis of argumen-
tativeness and duplication. See Tr. at 307-11. Consequently, 
the court adequately discharged its duty to cover the 
theories of both parties and fairly present the issues 
to the jury. 
Appellant claims that the trial court erred particularly 
in failing to give its special verdict form and requested 
instructions on calculation of lost profits. In a very 
recent case, however, the Utah Supreme Court, held: 
"[sjpecial verdicts and interrogatories are both 
matters within a trial court's discretion. . . 
In the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion, 
the trial court's action will not be disturbed." 
Canyon Country Store vs. Bracey, 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 
22-23 (1989), (citations omitted.) 
IN Bracey, the defendants (like the Appellant in 
this case) argued that the complexity of the case "mandated 
the use of specific interrogatories or verdicts in order 
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to help the jury enter a rational verdict." _Id_. at 23. 
The court observed, however, that: 
,f[a]| jury does not necessarily have to state directly 
how it resolved every important issue in a case to 
arrive at a rational and fair verdict." Ld. at 23. 
(citations omitted) 
the court further observed that while the case was complex 
in some respects (involving breach of an insurance contract 
and resultant damages), the jury did not appear to be 
overwhelmed by issues and evidence "as might have been 
the case in a convoluted antitrust or securities regulation 
matter." Id_. The court therefore held that their instructions 
were not prejudicial, but rather adequately assisted 
the jury in sorting out the issues. In this case, Appellant's 
special verdict form was likewise unnecessary. 
Moreover, Appellant's proposed instructions were 
unduly lengthy, complex and repetitive. While Respondent 
concedes that calculation of damages was inherrently difficult 
(based on Call's confusing evidence), compounding the 
complexity with complex jury instructions was not necessarily 
the solution. In many cases, everyday common sense is 
more valuable than complex, incomprehensible formulas. 
One need look no further than the testimony of Appellant's 
legion of experts for a good illustration of this point. 
The supposed purpose of expert testimony is to assist 
the jury in resolving the issues before it. In this case, 
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however, the experts' testimony was of arguably little 
assistance in this regard because although they all used 
complicated mathematical formulas, margins and percentages, 
they arrived at substantially different figures, ranging 
from $57,900 to $191,998. (Appellant's brief, p. 6.) 
The jury could not have avoided being confused by the 
experts1 testimony and that confusion would have only 
been compounded by Appellant's requested jury instructions. 
Furthermore, if, as asserted above, consideration of mitigation 
was proper, Appellant's requested jury instructions on 
calculation of damages included no provision for taking 
it into consideration. Appellant steadfastly maintains 
that the only correct measure of damages in this case 
is Call's lost profit on the project at issue. (emphasis 
added) E.g. Appellant's brief at 21-28. In reality, 
lost profits or expectation damages constitute the very 
most liberal recovery possible in any contract action. 
This rule is a matter of hornbook law, so elementary that 
reference to supporting authority is unnecessary. 
In Utah Farm Production Credit Assn. vs. Cox, 627 
P.2d 62, 64 (Utah, 1981), the court said: 
"Where a contractual agreement had been breached 
by a part thereto, the aggrieved party is entitled 
to [only] those damages what will put in as good 
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as position as he would have been had the other party 
performed pursuant to the agreement. . . the aggrieved 
party may not, either by action or inaction, aggravate 
the injury occasioned by the breach, but has a duty 
to mitigate his damages." Id_. at 64. 
By seeking to preclude consideration of mitigation, 
and basing the measure of damages in this case solely 
on the profits lost on this project, Appellant attempts 
to recover a windfall. (emphasis added) Because Manti 
breached the contract Call was undisputedly able to accept 
and earn profits from other projects which Call in fact 
did. Appellant is not satisfied with the position it 
would have been in if the contract had not been breached, 
however. It seeks to recover the profit it might have 
earned on this project as well as retain the profits earned 
on other projects. While Appellant is quick to cry "prejudice" 
to its own cause, it is more than willing to impose prejudicial 
burdens on Respondent. Appellant's position is therefore 
grossly unreasonable and should not be condoned. 
POINT V 
THE COURT DID NOT ALLOW MANTI TO PRESENT 
IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICIAL ISSUES 
AND ARGUMENTS TO THE JURY 
Appellant contends that the trial court allowed Respondent 
to present irrelevant and prejudicial issues and arguments 
to the jury. Call claims that Respondent presented evidence 
that the contract was in dispute; that Call was paid for 
everything he did; that Call could not proceed without 
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written authority; and that the taxpayer's would have 
to pay Call. (Appellant's brief p. 27.) These assertions 
are completely baseless, however. In response to Respondent's 
attempted to present evidence that even approached these 
issues Appellant vigorously objected, and the court repeatedly 
sustained Appellant's objections and carefully instructed 
the jury as to the evidence. Call introduced the contract 
into trial. Some consideration of the contract was essential 
to the determining of damage such as what had been paid 
to Call and the inspection provision of the contract. 
The record is devoid of prejudicial statements that taxpayers 
would have to pay. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DIRECTED A VERDICT 
IN FAVOR OF CALL FOR AT LEAST $56,000 OR 
AWARDED A NEW TRIAL 
Appellant claims that the trial court either should 
have directed a verdict for at least $56,000 or awarded 
a new trial. Appellant bases this argument on the fact 
that the jury disagreed with its asserted damage figures 
and awarded Call even less than the least amount calculated 
by any of Call's witnesses. This should not have come 
as a complete surprise, however, because the jury was 
instructed to take mitigation into consideration, while 
Call's witnesses did not. Assuming, (pursuant to the 
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discussion presented above), that mitigation evidence 
was appropriate for the jury's consideration, the jury 
could have very reasonably taken the $56,000 figure, subtracted 
the $22,000 which Call had already received from Respondent, 
coupled with a deduction for mitigation to arrive at $13,440 
verdict. 
The jury also may have reduced the verdict because 
of doubts as to the credibility of Call's witnesses and 
the figures they presented. It certainly would have been 
difficult to overlook the fact that there were substantial 
differences between each of the experts1 figures. In 
addition to Call's confusing and contradictory evidence 
on damages, neither Call himself, nor any of his witnesses 
would establish that Appellant actually lost money during 
the relevant time period. See Tr. at 243, 285.7. In 
fact the jury easily could have drawn an inference from 
the evidence that despite Respondent's breach, Appellant 
went on to accept and do other work which put Call Engineering 
in just as good (or nearly as good) a position as it would 
otherwise have been. It clearly is within the prerogative 
of the trier of fact to assess credibility of witnesses 
and choose between conflicting evidence. See Sorensen 
vs. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820, 830-31 (Utah App., 1989). 
Consequently, the jury reasonably may have concluded that 
Call's case was not as clear-cut as Appellant believed 
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it to be. 
Appellant emphasizes the fact that Respondent put 
on very little affirmative evidence to rebut Call's damage 
figures and claims that its own evidence was uncontroverted. 
Even the trial court was concerned about this. (Tr. 315-16) 
In Dairylanl Ins. Co., vs. Holder, 641 P.2d 136 (Utah, 
1982), the plaintiff raised similar concerns. "It characterize[d] 
defendant's evidence as 'mere scintilla' based on speculation 
and inferences." W_. at 138. The court found, however, 
that the defendant's evidence "constituted more than 'mere 
scintilla' and the jury reasonably could have reached 
its verdict based on defendant's evidence, notwithstanding 
plaintiff's testimony concerning his actions and motives. 
Id. at 139. In the instant case, Respondent relied on 
the testimony of David Thurgood and rigorous cross examination 
to reveal inconsistencies in Appellant's evidence and 
challenge the credibility in assertions. If there is 
any evidence upon which the jury could reasonably base 
its finding, it should stand. See Dairyland, 641 P.2d 
at 138. Consequently, upon viewing the jury's verdict 
in light of reasonably inferences that can be drawn from 
the evidence presented at trial, the verdict must stand. 
POINT VII 
CALL SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED 
HIS EXPERT WITNESS FEE COSTS 
Appellant argues completely contrary to Utah law 
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that Call should be awarded costs for his expert witness 
fees. Utah appellate courts, however, repeatedly have 
held that expert witness fees in excess of the statutory 
rates (U.C.A. 21-5-4), are not reimbursable "costs." 
See Frampton vs. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773-74 (Utah, 1980); 
Sorensen vs. Sorensen, 69 P.2d 820, 832 (Utah, 1989); 
Stevens vs. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 959 (Utah App. 1988). 
Appellant concedes this and admits that its argument is 
contrary to current Utah law, but argues that the current 
law is illogical and should be overturned. (Appellant's 
brief p. 41.) 
Appellant relied on Highland Construction Co., vs. 
Union Pacific Railroad Corp., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah, 1984), 
to supports its fees at trial, because under the extraordinary 
circumstances of the Highland case, the court awarded 
costs for expert depositions. In Highland, the court 
found that aware justified because of the complexity of the 
case. While Appellant emphasizes the complexity of the 
instant case, it is not nearly as complex as Appellant 
tried to make it appear. Appellant also fails to recognize 
the difference between awarding costs for expert fees 
at trial, as opposed to deposition costs. In Highland 
the costs awarded did not exceed $2,500 while in this 
case Appellant is claiming almost $10,000. Appellant 
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duplicated expenses in this case by deposing its experts 
and calling them to testify at trial as well. Counsel 
was obviously aware of the added expense this would cause, 
as well as the near certainty that such expenses would 
not be recoverable as costs. Respondent should not be 
penalized for Appellant's inefficient handling of the 
case. It also should be noted that since Highland, the 
Utah Court of Appeals has emphasized that despite the 
necessity of incurring the expense of expert witness fees 
in the preparation of litigation, they are not chargable 
as costs. See Stevens 754 P.2d at 959. 
Appellant bemoans the fact that if costs are not 
awarded for expert witness fees almost all of its $13,440 
verdict will go to experts. An identical argument was 
asserted in a very recent Utah Court of Appeals case. 
See Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City vs. Dasakalas, 
119 Utah Adv. Rep. 70, (Utah App. 1989). Plaintiffs in 
that case lost their property to condemnation. They argued 
that they had been deprived of constitutionally mandated 
just compensation: 
"because they [had] been required to expend a considerable 
portion of their award which was founded on the 
fair market value of their property, for the services 
of expert witnesses and other reasonably necessary 
litigation expenses." Ld. at 76. 
In response, however, the court concluded that "expert 
witness fees are not reimbursable 'costs1 and upheld 
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the trial court's refusal to aware compensation for expert 
witness fees incurred to establish the value of the property. 
Id. at 77. Despite the court's apparent sympathy for 
plaintiffs1 position, it deferred to the legislature for 
an adjustment of the law. See Id. Consequently, Appellant's 
fervent plea for an award of costs to cover its expert 
witness fees is unpersuasive. If the law should be rewritten, 
this certainly is not the case for it. 
CONCLUSION 
The only issue to be considered by the jury was to 
determine damages. The jury was admonished this was their 
only charge. The jury was properly instructed concerning 
damage determination. 
Call was not prejudiced by either allowing amended 
pleadings to permit mitigation of damages given the supreme 
court's instructions or the court's failure to grant a 
continuance. 
The trial on damages was not tainted with irrelevant 
or prejudicial issues or statements. 
The evidence presented in its contradictory nature 
does not support a directed verdict, a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict or a new trial. 
Accordingly, this court should affirm the lower court. 
* -t-4 \ ' 
,i. M <*-DATED t h i s • yh-l — day of / \-4JIJ . / 1989, 
26 
Respectfully Submitted, 
PAUL R. FRISCHKNECHT 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
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ADDENDUM 
Rule 8 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am Jur 2d Motions, 
Rules, and Orders ^ 1 et seq., 61A Am. Jur 2d 
Pleading §§ 1 et seq , 238 
C.J.S. — 60 C J S Motions and Orders k 1 
et seq , 71 C J S Pleading ^§ 63 to 210, 140 et 
seq., 211 et seq 
A.L.R. — Proceeding for summary judgment 
as affected by presentation of counterclaim, 8 
ALR3d 1361 
Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief, A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, 
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, 
shall contain ( D a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to 
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several differ-
ent types may be demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms 
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments 
upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or informa-
tion sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state 
and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of 
the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a 
part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true 
and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends 
in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he 
may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or para-
graphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated 
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend 
to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the 
obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, 
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, 
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of 
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affir-
mative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a coun-
terclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so 
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a respon-
sive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are 
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a plead-
ing to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as 
denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No 
technical forms of pleading or motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense 
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate 
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alter-
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Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action 
as affected by opponent's motion for summary 
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or di-
rected verdict, 36 A L R 3d 1113 
Key Numbers. — Motions «=» 1 et seq.; 
Pleading «= 38V2 to 186, 187 et seq 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 8 
native and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the 
pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the 
alternative statements A party may also state as many separate claims 
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal 
or on equitable grounds or on both All statements shall be made subject 
to the obligations set forth in Rule 11 
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially the same as Rule 8, F R C P 
Cross-References. — Amended and supple-
mental pleadings, Rule 15 
Arbitration, § 78-31 a-1 et seq 
Comparative negligence, § 78-27 38 
Counterclaim and cross-claim, Rule 13 
Creditors, assignment for benefit of, § 6-1-1 
et seq 
Defenses and objections, Rule 12 
Fee for filing cross-claim or counterclaim, 
§§ 78-3-16 5, 78-4-24, 78-6-14, Appx G, Code 
of Judicial Administration 
Fellow servant defined, § 34-25-2 
Form of pleadings, Rule 10 
Forms intended to indicate simplicity and 
brevity of statement, Rule 84 
Forms of answers, Forms 21, 22 
Hearing of certain defenses before trial, Rule 
12(d) 
Interpleader, Rule 22 
Motions, forms for, Forms 20, 23 to 24 
Numbered paragraphs, Rule 10(b) 
One form of action, Rule 2 
Reply to answer, order for, Rule 7(a) 
Secunty interest, enforceability of, 
§ 70A-9-203 
Special forms of pleadings and writs abol-
ished, Rule 65B(a) 
Statute of frauds, generally, § 25-5-1 et seq 
Statute of frauds, investment securities, 
§ 70A-8-319 
Statute of frauds, sales, § 70A-2-201 
Statute of frauds, Uniform Commercial 
Code, personal property not otherwise covered, 
§ 70A-1-206 
Third-party practice, Rule 14 
Time for answer, Rules 3(b), 12(a) 
Uniform Commercial Code, supplementary 
principles of law applicable, § 70A-1-103 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affirmative defenses 
—Accord and satisfaction 
Pleading 
Time limitation 
—Consent 
—Election of remedies 
—Estoppel 
Failure to plead 
—Failure of consideration 
Failure to plead 
Pleading 
—Failure to plead 
Affidavit opposing summary judgment 
Denial 
Notice and opportunity 
Waiver of defense 
—Fraud 
Necessary allegations 
—Mitigation of damages 
Failure to plead 
Pleading 
—Mutual mistake 
—Statute of frauds 
Motion to dismiss 
Pleading 
—Statute of limitations 
Applicability to plaintiffs 
Pleading 
Waiver 
—Waiver 
Claims for relief 
—Amendment of pleading 
—Attorney fees 
—Essential allegations 
Alienation of affections 
—Request for alternative relief 
—Sufficiency of complaint 
Attachment of exhibit 
Found not sufficient 
Found sufficient 
Liberal construction 
Consistency 
—Double recovery 
—Election between claims 
—Election of remedies under contract 
—Res judicata 
—Separate claims 
Contract and quantum meruit 
Defenses 
—Lack of consideration 
Purpose of rules 
Cited 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 15 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. —- 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties or indemnity from original tortfeasor, 20 
§ 188 et seq. A.L.R.4th 338. 
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties §§ 72 to 84. Key Numbers. — Parties «=> 49 to 56. 
A.L.R. — Defendant's right to contribution 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is 
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been 
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days 
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or 
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may 
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by 
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense as-
serted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occur-
rence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the 
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a 
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events 
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supple-
mented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is 
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it 
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall 
so order, specifying the time therefor. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially identical to Rule 15, F.R.C.P. 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 40 
Rule 40. Assignment of cases for trial; continuance. 
(a) Order and precedence. The district courts shall provide by rule for 
the placing of actions upon the trial calendar (1) without request of the parties 
or (2) upon request of a party and notice to the other parties or (3) m such 
other manner as the courts may deem expedient Precedence shall be given to 
actions entitled thereto by statute 
(b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a party, the court may in 
its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, including the payment of 
costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon 
good cause shown If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence of 
evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of the evidence 
expected to be obtained and shall show that due diligence has been used to 
procure it. The court may also require the party seeking the continuance to 
state, upon affidavit or under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and if 
the adverse party thereupon admits that such evidence would be given, and 
that it may be considered as actually given on the trial, or offered and ex-
cluded as improper, the trial shall not be postponed upon that ground. 
(c) Taking testimony of witnesses present. If required by the adverse 
party, the court shall, as a condition to such postponement, proceed to have 
the testimony of any witness present taken, in the same manner as if at the 
trial, and the testimony so taken may be read on the trial with the same 
effect, and subject to the same objections that may be made with respect to a 
deposition under the provisions of Rule 32(c)(1) and (2) [Rule 32 (c)(3)(A) and 
(B)]. 
Compiler's Notes. — Following the amend-
ment of Rule 32, effective January 1, 1987, the 
reference to Rule 32(c)(1) and (2), at the end of 
Subdivision (c), should now be to Rule 
32(c)(3)(A) and (B) 
ANALYSIS 
Postponement 
—Absence of party 
—Discretion of court 
— I^nability of counsel to attend tnal. 
Unavoidable absence 
—New theory of case 
—Procedural delays 
—Supporting affidavits 
—Unavailable witness 
Lack of diligence 
Need 
Cited 
Postponement. 
—Absence of party. 
Continuance would not be granted because 
of absence of a party, unless he was a material 
witness, and, if so, the facts expected to be 
proved by him had to be stated under oath, 
unless the oath was waived It was also neces 
Subdivision (a) of this rule is similar to Rule 
40, F R C P 
Cross-References. — Amendment of plead-
ings to conform to evidence, continuance upon, 
Rule 15(b) 
sary that party had used due diligence to be 
present at the tnal McGrath v Tallent, 7 
Utah 256, 26 P 574 (1891) 
Refusal of tnal court to postpone tnal was 
not abuse of discretion where case was set 
down for tnal, and had once before been con-
tinued because of absence of party who was 
pnncipal witness, and second continuance was 
sought by attorney who was not of record in 
case Lancino v Smith, 36 Utah 462, 105 P 
914 (1909) 
Refusal to grant continuance in personal in-
jury case was an abuse of discretion where 
plaintiff was not able to attend the tnal be-
cause of his physical condition, there was no 
evidence of malmgenng by the plaintiff, and 
the plaintiffs testimony was essential to his 
case Bairas v Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 
P 2d 375 (1962) 
—Discretion of court. 
Denial of motion for continuance was within 
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21-5-4 FEES 
separate line item appropriation contained in the appropriation to the Judi-
cial Council. 
(2) If expenses exceed the line item appropriation, the administrator of the 
courts shall submit a claim against the state to the Board of Examiners and 
request the board to recommend and submit a supplemental appropriation 
request to the Legislature for the deficit incurred. 
History: C. 1953, 21-5-1.5, enacted by L. became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to 
1989, ch. 153, § 5. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 153 
21-5-4. Witness fees and mileage. 
(1) Every witness legally required or in good faith requested to attend a 
circuit or district court, or a grand jury, is entitled to $17 per day for each day 
in attendance and if traveling 50 miles or more, 25 cents for each mile actu-
ally and necessarily traveled in going only. 
(2) If a witness is attending from outside the state in a civil case, mileage 
for him is allowed at the rate of 25 cents per mile and taxed for the distance 
actually and necessarily traveled inside the state, in going only, 
(3) If the witness is attending from outside the state in a criminal case, the 
state shall reimburse the witness under Section 77-21-3. 
(4) If a witness is attending from outside the county but from within the 
state in a civil case or criminal case, mileage for him is allowed at the rate of 
25 cents per mile and taxed for the distance actually and necessarily traveled, 
in going only. 
(5) A prosecution witness or a witness subpoenaed by an indigent defendant 
attending from outside the county but within the state may receive reim-
bursement for necessary lodging expenses under rule of the Judicial Council. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 994; L. The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 
1911, ch. 9, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 2545; L. 1925, 1989, in Subsection (1), substituted "$17" for 
ch. 96, § 1; R.S. 1933, 28-5-4; L. 1937, ch. 30, n$14" and substituted "if traveling 50 miles or 
§ 1; C. 1943,28-5-4; L. 1951, ch. 41, § 1; 1977, more, 25 cents" for "30 cents"; inserted "at the 
ch. 98, § 1; 1988, ch. 152, § 10; 1989, ch. 153, rate of 25 cents per mile" in Subsection (2); and 
§ 6. added Subsections (4) and (5). 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1988 amendment, A.L.R. — Requirements, under Rule 45(c) of 
effective April 25,1988, divided the former sec- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 
tion into Subsections (1) and (2); substituted "a 17(d) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
circuit" for "upon a city" following "attend" in relating to service of subpoena and tender of 
Subsection (1); added Subsection (3); and made witness fees and mileage allowance, 77 A.L.R. 
minor stylistic changes. Fed. 863. 
21-5-4.5. Allocation of food allowance costs for jurors. 
(1) Jurors serving in a criminal action in district and circuit court may be 
provided with reasonable food allowances at the expense of the state under the 
rules of the Judicial Council. 
(2) When a jury in a criminal action in the district and circuit court has 
been placed in sequestration by order of the court, the necessary expenses for 
food and lodging shall be provided at the expense of the state under the rules 
of the Judicial Council. 
(3) These provisions also apply to any jury trial held in the juvenile court. 
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